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This study examined how stimulus elimination (SE) in a preference judgment task affects
observers’ choices. Previous research suggests that biasing gaze toward one alternative
can increase preference for it; this preference reciprocally promotes gaze bias. Shimojo
et al. (2003) called this phenomenon the Gaze Cascade Effect. They showed that the
likelihood that an observer’s gaze was directed toward their chosen alternative increased
steadily until the moment of choosing. Therefore, we tested whether observers would
prefer an alternative at which they had been gazing last if both alternatives were removed
prior to the start of this rising gaze likelihood. To test this, we used a preference judgment
task and controlled stimulus presentation based on gaze using an eye-tracking system.
A pair of non-sensical figures was presented on the computer screen and both stimuli
were eliminated while participants were still making their preference decision. The timing
of the elimination differed between two experiments. In Experiment 1, after gazing at
both stimuli one or more times, stimuli were removed when the participant’s gaze fell on
one alternative, pre-selected as the target stimulus. There was no significant difference in
the preference of the two alternatives. In Experiment 2, we did not predefine any target
stimulus. After the participant gazed at both stimuli one or more times, both stimuli
were eliminated when the participant next fixated on either. The likelihood of choosing
the stimulus that was gazed at last (at the moment of elimination) was greater than
chance. Results showed that controlling participants’ choices using gaze-contingent SE
was impossible, but the different results between these two experiments suggest that
participants decided which stimulus to choose during their first period of gazing at each
alternative. Thus, we could predict participants’ choices by analyzing eye movement
patterns at the moment of SE.
Keywords: eye movements, preference, gaze bias, decision-making, non-sensical figure
Introduction
The production and measurement of preferences, deﬁned as positive emotional valences for
certain objects, has been of interest to psychology and related ﬁelds for decades. Speciﬁcally, the
relationship between preferences and eye movements has been well studied. Eye movements can
cause preferences, as in the case of the mere-exposure eﬀect, famously demonstrated by Zajonc
(1968), wherein looking at an object increases one’s preference for it. Eye movements can also
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identify preferences, for example, by using the preferential-
looking method, where it is presumed that people tend to look
more at stimuli that they prefer (Fantz, 1961, 1963, 1964).
Shimojo et al. (2003) analyzed eye movements during
alternative forced-choice preference judgment tasks. Pairs of
faces or pairs of ﬁgures made with Fourier descriptors were
presented simultaneously on a computer screen and participants
were asked to choose the more attractive stimulus. “Gaze
likelihood” was deﬁned as the proportion of gazing directed at
their chosen stimulus. Gaze likelihood gradually increased from
about 0.6 s before making a selection. This tendency was seen
only for tasks in which participants were asked to choose the
more attractive stimulus and not in tasks where individuals were
asked to indicate the more unattractive or rounder face. The
authors described this phenomenon as the “gaze cascade eﬀect,”
wherein the mere-exposure eﬀect and preferential looking both
operate to create a positive feedback loop; exposure increases
preference and preference increases exposure. The authors
proposed a dual-contribution model of preference formation
with two kinds of input. One input is a cognitive assessment
system in which participants compare with templates. The other
input is orienting behavior, which contributes to preference
decision-making by integrating preferential looking and mere-
exposure in a positive feedback loop, leading to the conscious
choice. The decision module would then be responsible for
integrating information from these two inputs across time.
A decision would be made when a threshold is reached.
Simion and Shimojo (2007) improved upon the procedure
of Shimojo et al. (2003) by changing the duration of stimuli
presentation; both stimuli were randomly removed after 800–
5000 ms. Participants were asked to choose the more attractive
among presented faces by pressing a key regardless of whether the
stimuli had disappeared. Trials were classiﬁed as “early decisions”
and “late decisions” based on whether the participant made
their decision before or after the stimuli disappeared. In early
decisions, participants were asked to conﬁrm their decision by
pressing the button again after stimulus oﬀset. Gaze likelihood
increased before the ﬁnal button press (decision conﬁrmation or
decision, respectively) in both types of trials despite the absence of
stimuli. This suggested that once a gaze cascade eﬀect has started,
visual orientation toward the location of the preferred image does
not stop and acts independently of the presence of stimuli.
The gaze cascade eﬀect proposed by Shimojo et al. (2003)
has been criticized. Glaholt and Reingold (2009a) used images
of photographic art and conducted two-alternative and eight-
alternative forced-choice judgment tasks for preference and
typicality. In the typicality judgment tasks, participants were
asked to choose the most unusual stimulus. Results showed
that gaze bias toward the chosen stimulus was observed
not only in the preference judgment task but also in the
typicality-judgment task. Accordingly, the authors suggested that
gaze bias reﬂects a general characteristic of visual decision-
making, not a mechanism speciﬁc to preference judgments.
Similarly, other experiments have indicated that gaze bias can
be nearly identical for non-preference decisions (Glaholt and
Reingold, 2009b, 2011; Nittono and Wada, 2009; Schotter
et al., 2010). One possible explanation for the discrepancy
between studies is the use of diﬀerent stimulus categories.
Shimojo et al. (2003) originally used faces and ﬁgures made by
Fourier descriptors. Other research groups have used pictures
of natural scenes or geometric ﬁgures. Recent studies have
demonstrated that stimulus type is an important factor in
gaze cascade generation (Park et al., 2010; Liao et al., 2011).
For example, Park et al. (2010) conducted a two-alternative
preference judgment task using a novel stimulus and a
repeatedly presented stimulus. Face stimuli elicited a familiarity
preference, whereas natural scenes elicited a novelty preference.
There was no strong bias for geometric stimuli. These results
indicate that stimulus category might aﬀect the gaze cascade
phenomenon.
On the other hand, preference judgment is aﬀected by some
experimental manipulation. Shimojo et al. (2003) conducted
gaze manipulation in Experiment 2 of their study based on the
gaze cascade model. Two faces were repeatedly and alternately
presented for 900 and 300 ms, respectively, before, the preference
judgment. Faces alternated to the right and left in the gaze
manipulation condition. Meanwhile in the control condition,
both faces alternated in the same location. The preference
bias for the alternative that was presented longer was seen in
the manipulation condition, but not in the control condition.
Accordingly, they concluded that gaze manipulation could
directly inﬂuence the preference judgment.
The gaze cascade model predicts that participants will be
gazing at their chosen stimulus at the time of judgment.
Interestingly, this raises the question of whether participants
simply prefer the stimulus at which they most recently gazed.
Simion and Shimojo (2007) analyzed the relationship between
preference judgments and stimulus elimination (SE) and found
that participants were more likely to be gazing at their preferred
stimulus immediately prior to SE. However, in their study, data
were analyzed from multiple, random SE durations concurrently.
Another study by Simion and Shimojo (2006) used a moving
window to restrict participants’ visual ﬁeld, but no research has
controlled the timing of the SE. Accordingly, in this study, we
manipulated the timing of SE and examined whether participants
more often preferred the stimuli at which they were gazing at the
time of SE. We predicted that if gazing behavior is important for
preference judgments, the rate of choosing the stimulus that was
most recently gazed at should be greater than chance.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we conducted a preference judgment task
with non-sensical ﬁgures. The stimuli were eliminated when an
individual gazed at a predeﬁned target stimulus.
Method
Participants
Eight Japanese adults (four women, four men; mean age
21.9 ± 1.2 years) participated in this experiment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants
provided informed consent in accordance with a protocol
approved by the local ethics committee of Keio University. They
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were individually tested and paid 870 Japanese yen for their
participation.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Participants’ eye movements were recorded by the eye-tracking
system, Eyelink 1000 (SR Research Ltd.). Stimuli were presented
in the center of 23-inch display (Mitsubishi, model RDT234WX).
The display was viewed from a distance of 75 cm and the head
was stabilized. The display resolution was 1920 × 1080 pixels,
and the visual angles were 37.5◦ horizontally and 21.6◦ vertically.
Eight non-sensical ﬁgures were uniquely generated using a
Fourier-descriptor algorithm based on Zahn and Roskies (1972).
Stimuli were selected based on the pretest results. In the pretest,
135 ﬁgures were presented individually on the screen and 40
participants were asked to rate their preference for each ﬁgure
on a scale from 0 (very unattractive) to 100 (very attractive). We
selected the eight ﬁgures whose mean preference scores were
closest to neutral with small SD. The actual preference scores
ranged from 41.1 to 51.1 with SD less than 16.8. These ﬁgures
are shown in Figure 1.
Procedure
After participants were informed of the experiment and
procedures, they sat on a chair in front of a computer screen, and
the calibration procedure of the eye-tracker was completed. The
test phase consisted of 112 trials. All combinations of the eight
ﬁgures were presented twice. One stimulus was predetermined to
be the target stimulus. For example, there were two trials where
ﬁgure A was presented on the right side and ﬁgure B on the
left side; ﬁgure A was predetermined to be the target stimulus
in one trial and ﬁgure B was predetermined to be the target
stimulus in the other. The order of trials was counterbalanced
across participants.
Fixation was deﬁned as gazing at the stimulus area for more
than 300 ms. In each trial, a ﬁxation cross was presented
and participants were asked to stare at it. When ﬁxation on
the cross was detected, it was removed and two ﬁgures were
presented, one on each side of the screen. After ﬁxation on
both ﬁgures was detected, the ﬁgures were eliminated when
the participant ﬁxated again on the side that had contained
the target stimulus. At the same time, an auditory tone
was delivered to notify participants to be ready to respond.
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli used in the experiment.
Participants were asked to inspect the stimulus pair freely
until the stimuli were removed and to choose the more
attractive stimulus by pressing a key with no time pressure.
After making a choice, the next trial began with no inter-trial
interval.
The target choice rate was deﬁned as the proportion of choices
of the target stimuli. The choice consistency rate was deﬁned
as the proportion of agreement between trial pairs with the
same stimuli (but diﬀerent target stimulus). Response latency was
calculated as the time from SE to the key pressing.
Results
Target Choice Rate and Choice Consistency Rate
The target choice rate, the choice consistency rate, and the mean
response latency for each participant are shown in Table 1. The
average target choice rate was 0.491 (SD= 0.036), and the average
choice consistency rate was 0.821 (SD = 0.078). An independent
samples t-test of arcsine-transformed choice rates indicated that
choice rate did not diﬀer from chance [t(7)= −0.71, n.s., Cohen’s
d = 0.25]. Meanwhile an arcsine-transformed choice consistency
rates were also higher than chance [t(7) = 9.80, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 3.47].
Gaze Likelihood
Gaze likelihood before SE for each participant is shown
in Figure 2. The gaze likelihood was around chance levels
(0.500) and gaze bias was not observed before the SE.
Figure 3 shows gaze likelihood from the SE to response.
Participant gaze gradually shifted toward the chosen alternative
about 500 ms before the response despite the absence of
stimuli.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we examined whether gaze-contingent SE
biased choices in a preference judgment task. Despite SE being
contingent upon gazing at the target stimulus, there was no
diﬀerence in the rate of choosing target and non-target stimuli
(i.e., there was no choice bias). The results of the gaze likelihood
analyses showed that gaze bias was not observed before the
SE but was observed before responses. This result is consistent
with the results of Simion and Shimojo (2007). This means that
TABLE 1 | Choice rate, consistency rate, and mean response latency in
Experiment 1.
Participant Target choice rate Consistency rate Choice
latency (ms)
A 0.446 0.821 748.2
B 0.518 0.893 892.1
C 0.491 0.804 685.1
D 0.491 0.732 868.5
E 0.482 0.929 700.7
F 0.563 0.696 681.4
G 0.473 0.839 764.5
H 0.464 0.857 1149.2
Average (SD) 0.491 (0.036) 0.821 (0.078) 811.2 (158.2)
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FIGURE 2 | Gaze likelihood before stimulus elimination (SE) for each participant in Experiment 1.
FIGURE 3 | Gaze likelihood after stimulus elimination for each participant in Experiment 1.
participants shifted their gaze prior to key pressing regardless of
stimuli presentation.
One possible cause for the lack of any observed SE eﬀect
may be the nature of the stimuli. We used eight non-sensical
ﬁgures for which participants were expected to have no strong
preferences. Interestingly, however, choice consistency rates
were high, suggesting that participants had reliable preferences
for certain stimuli. Strong inherent preferences could have
masked the smaller eﬀect of our SE manipulation. Another
possible cause for these results relates to the procedures. In this
experiment, stimuli sometimes were not eliminated smoothly
because participants had immediately decided which stimulus
to choose and gazed only at that stimulus. To account for
these problems in Experiment 1, we improved the procedure in
Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, the timing of the SE was varied. We did
not predetermine the target stimulus. We used another
type of non-sensical ﬁgure and conducted a pretest using
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diﬀerent participants in order to select experimental
stimuli.
Method
Participants
Eight diﬀerent Japanese adults (four women, four men; mean age
23.8 ± 3.0 years) participated in this experiment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were tested after
providing informed consent and paid 870 Japanese yen for their
participation.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except for the
timing of the SE. No target stimulus was predetermined in
Experiment 2. Fixation was deﬁned as gazing at a stimulus’ area
for more than 300 ms. After ﬁxation on both ﬁgures was detected,
the ﬁgures were eliminated and an auditory tone was delivered
when the participant was gazing again at either stimuli. A test
phase was consisted of 112 trials. As before, all combinations
of the eight ﬁgures were presented twice. The order of trials
was counterbalanced across participants. Concordance rate was
deﬁned as the proportion of trials in which the target of ﬁxation
immediately prior to the SE and the preference choice were
consistent.
Results
Concordance Rate and Choice Consistency Rate
The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Table 2. The average
concordance rate was 0.575 (SD = 0.068), and the average
choice consistency rate was 0.806 (SD = 0.101). An independent
samples t-test of the arcsine-transformed concordance rates
indicated that the rate of choosing the stimulus that was
gazed at immediately prior to SE (e.g., the third ﬁxation) was
signiﬁcantly greater than chance [t(7) = 3.10, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 1.01]. An arcsine-transformed choice consistency rates
were also higher than chance [t(7) = 7.28, p < 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 2.57].
Gaze Likelihood
The gaze likelihood before the SE is shown in Figure 4,
and the gaze likelihood following the SE is shown in Figure 5.
The gaze likelihood before the SE was greater than chance,
but the patterns of increase were diﬀerent across participants.
For some participants, the gaze likelihood increased in the
1000–2000 ms prior to the SE. From the SE to the response,
gaze likelihood gradually increased about 400–500 ms before
responding, similar to Experiment 1.
TABLE 2 | Concordance rate, consistency rate, and response latency in
Experiment 2.
Participant Concordance rate Consistency rate Choice
latency (ms)
I 0.652 0.804 645.9
J 0.500 0.696 1808.3
K 0.554 0.893 566.4
L 0.563 0.875 708.9
M 0.509 0.946 1440.6
N 0.518 0.804 1223.8
O 0.634 0.643 926.3
P 0.670 0.786 656.8
Average (SD) 0.575 (0.068) 0.806 (0.101) 997.1 (450.2)
FIGURE 4 | Gaze likelihood before stimulus elimination for each participant in Experiment 2.
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FIGURE 5 | Gaze likelihood after stimulus elimination for each participant in Experiment 2.
Comparison with Experiment 1
An unpaired t-test was performed after arcsine-transformation
in order to compare the results of both experiments. The
concordance rate in Experiment 2 was higher than the target
choice rate in Experiment 1 [t(14) = 3.08, p < 0.01, Cohen’s
d = 1.54]. Meanwhile the choice consistency rate in Experiment
2 was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that in Experiment 1
[t(14) = 0.26, n.s., Cohen’s d = 0.13]. The mean gaze likelihoods
in both experiments are shown in Figure 6. The gaze likelihoods
ﬂuctuated up and down above chance before SE in both
experiments, and the likelihood was higher in Experiment 1 than
it was in Experiment 2 at the moment of SE. The gaze likelihood
before the response gradually increased about 400 ms before
responding in both experiments. The likelihood in Experiment
2 was generally higher than it was in Experiment 1.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we did not predetermine the target stimulus
and examined whether one’s ﬁxation immediately prior to SE
was related to actual choices. The results showed that the
rate of choosing this pre-SE ﬁxation stimulus was greater than
chance, indicating that pre-SE ﬁxation could predict preference
judgments. However, these results require further evaluation
before concluding that the timing of SE caused this phenomenon.
As in Experiment 1, the choice consistency rate in Experiment
2 was high, suggesting that after ﬁxating on the two stimuli,
participants may have already judged which stimulus they
preferred and then ﬁxated again more often on the stimulus they
would ultimately choose. Furthermore, in most trials participants
gazed in the order of right–left–right or left–right–left. It might
be interpreted from this that the eﬀect of gazing upon a stimulus
FIGURE 6 | Mean gaze likelihoods in each experiment. Blue and green lines represent the mean likelihood in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively.
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when it is removed is not important, but rather that the stimulus
gazed upon ﬁrst is most important for determining preference.
In order to resolve this issue, future studies will need to eliminate
stimuli at other times (e.g., after the fourth or ﬁfth ﬁxation).
Gaze likelihood analyses indicated that an increasing pattern
was not observed among the participants before the SE. As in
Experiment 1, gaze likelihood did increase between 300 and
600 ms before responding, despite the absence of stimuli. This
result is consistent with the results of Simion and Shimojo (2007)
in which the gaze likelihood increased before the ﬁnal button
press despite the absence of stimuli. This supports the notion that
gaze bias is independent of the presentation of stimuli.
General Discussion
The aim of this research was to examine the eﬀect of removing
stimuli in a preference judgment task. Speciﬁcally, we explored
whether preferences were biased toward the image that was the
target of gaze ﬁxation immediately prior to SE. We observed
no choice bias in Experiment 1, where one stimulus was
predetermined to be the target triggering SE. Choice bias
was observed in Experiment 2, where no target stimulus was
predetermined and stimuli were eliminated only when the
participant had gazed at both stimuli and was gazing again at
either of the stimuli. These results indicate that we could predict
a participant’s preference based on which stimulus they gazed at
after having gazed at both.
According to our gaze likelihood analyses, participants gazed
at both stimuli equally before the SE in Experiment 1. In
Experiment 2, however, gaze was directed more toward the
chosen alternative prior to the SE. Additionally, gaze gradually
shifted toward the chosen alternative after the SE until making
a response in both experiments. Simion and Shimojo (2007)
explained that the gaze bias before the response was caused by
the orienting behavior that acts independently of the presence
of visual stimuli and they concluded that the gaze cascade eﬀect
is a preference-speciﬁc phenomenon. However, the ﬁndings are
explainable by the idea that the gaze bias was not caused by
the feedback loop of mere-exposure and preferential looking
suggested by the gaze cascade model, but rather this gaze bias
may reﬂect preparing for the response. As noted above, some
previous studies showed that the time-series variation of gaze
likelihood before the response for non-preferential tasks does
not diﬀer from that for preferential tasks (Glaholt and Reingold,
2009b, 2011; Nittono and Wada, 2009; Schotter et al., 2010).
These phenomena, also interpreted as gaze bias, reﬂect a general
characteristic of visual decision-making rather than a preference-
speciﬁc mechanism. Further studies are needed to conﬁrm that
such gaze bias is a general characteristic.
This research has some limitations. There is no way of
knowing when and how preferences were judged, and they may
have occurred well before SE. To solve this problem, other types
of procedures would be eﬀective. One method would be to make
the stimulus visible only when gaze is ﬁxed at the area of the
stimulus. Another method would be to use a greater number of
stimuli, instead of repeating the same stimuli. If the preference-
choice bias observed in our study persists under these conditions,
the possibility of predicting and controlling one’s preferences
based on their ﬁnal ﬁxation prior to stimulus removal would be
more reliable.
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